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Weinberg: Search and Seizure

COUNTY COURT, MONROE COUNTY
People v. Reynolds'
(decided August, 31, 2000)
The State of New York appealed from an order that granted
the defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result
of an unlawful stop of the defendant's automobile. 2 Following the
initial stop, the defendant was charged with driving while3
intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § § 1192 (2)
and (3),4 and having an unregistered motor vehicle in violation of
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 401 (1) (a).5
The facts of the case were undisputed. Police officer Korey
Brown was patrolling a parking lot on Lyell Avenue, when he
observed a known male prostitute enter the defendant's pickup
truck.6 Officer Brown proceeded to run a registration check from
the license plate of the defendant's truck and discovered that the
registration was expired. The officer proceeded to stop the vehicle,
and placed the defendant in the backseat of the police car, leaving
the occupant in the pickup truck.7 During his investigation, Officer
Brown stated that he observed that the defendant showed signs of
intoxication such as watery, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and an
odor of alcohol.8 Thereafter the officer began to perform a
sobriety test on the defendant, which the defendant failed. 9 The
defendant was then arrested and charged with driving while

1People v. Reynolds, 185 Misc. 2d 674, 713 N.Y.S.2d 813 (2000).
675, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
3 VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192.1 "Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person
shall operate a motor vehicle while such person has .10 of one per centum or
more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood as shown by chemical analysis
of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva. .. ." Id.
4 VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192.2 "Driving while intoxicated. No person shall
operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition." Id.
5 VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 401 (1) (a), states in pertinent part, "Registration by
owners. a. No motor vehicle shall be operated or driven upon the public
highways of this state without first being registered in accordance with the
provisions of this article . . . ." It.
Reynolds, 185 Misc. 2d at 675, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
7Id. The police officer later testified that this was done to separate the two men
in order to investigate possible prostitution activity. Id.
8 id.
2Id. at

9Id.
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intoxicated.' 0 The officer did not discover any evidence regarding
possible prostitution during his initial investigation."
During a probable cause hearing, the police officer testified
to the above facts, and the hearing court issued a written decision
granting defendant's motion to suppress all evidence derived from
the traffic stop, detention and ensuing arrest. 12 The hearing court
based its decision on the police officer's lack of reasonable
suspicion and probable cause for the DWI arrest in violation of the
United States and New York State Constitutions.' 3 In doing so, the
court determined that vehicular stops must not be pretextual. 14 The
standard the court used for assessing whether a stop is pretextual in
nature was a primary motivation test. 15 The court went on to state
that in the instant case, the motivation behind the police officer's
initial stop was to investigate the possibility of prostitution and
therefore the license plate check was unrelated to a traffic or
equipment violation.' 6 The hearing court concluded its analysis by
stating that:
[T]he primary motivation of the officer was the
investigation of perceived prostitution ....
[T]he
officer observed no criminal conduct; his
investigation of the matter and detention of
defendant . . . resulted in no charges . . . for
prostitution activities. A good faith belief by the
officer that there was a violation of the vehicle and
traffic law, coupled with the surrounding
circumstances did not provided reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop. 17
The charges against the defendant were then dismissed and
the people appealed.' During oral argument in front of this court
on appeal, the People focused on the idea that pursuant to Whren v.
10 Id.
" Id. at 676, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
12 Reynolds, 185 Misc. 2d at 675, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
13id.
14 id.
15 See People v. Dickson, 180 Misc. 2d 113, 114-15, 690 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
16 Reynolds, 185 Misc. 2d at 676, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
17 id.
18 Id.
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United States,19 the stop of the defendant's car was legal because
the officer's subjective motivation was not relevant.2 ° The
defendant argued that the hearing court was correct in its decision
because New York law supports the view that pretextual stops are
outlawed. 2 1 The question in front of the court was whether the
decision of Whren v. United States, which interprets the Fourth
Amendment's 22 protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures, governs unreasonable searches and seizures of
automobiles in New York State.23
The court started its inquiry by discussing the decision in
Whren, where the Supreme Court held that the defendant's Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure was not
violated where a police officer's temporary detention was based on
a probable belief that he had violated a traffic law, even though a
reasonable officer would not have stopped the defendant motorist
without some additional objective. 24 The Court in Whren cited its
25
previous decisions in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
United States v. Robinson,26 and Scott v. United States,27 stating
that these cases "served to foreclose any argument that the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved" and reaffirmed that
'9517 U.S. 806. (1996).
20

Reynolds, 185 Misc. 2d at 676, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 815.

21 id.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV, states, in relevant part, "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... but upon probable cause ...
22

Id.
23 Reynolds, 185 Misc. 2d at 676, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
24

Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.

25 462 U.S. 579. (1983) (holding that customs officers did not violate the

defendant's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure
when it boarded a sailboat in order to check its documentation pursuant to Title
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which permits custom officers to board any vessel within
the United States to examine its documentation).
26 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest of a
defendant does not violate the Fourth Amendment, reiterating that it is a well
settled exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
" 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (articulating the proper approach to evaluate a violation
of a defendant's Fourth Amendment right is to objectively assess the officer's
actions in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances, not the officer's
subjective motivations).
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subjective intentions do
not play a role in a probable-cause Fourth
28
Amendment analysis.
The relevant parts of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the New York Constitution Article I § 1229
are identical. They both provide that the "right of people to be
secure in their persons... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated ... but upon probable cause .... ,30
Although their wording is consistent, there has been different
interpretation by the courts in their respective applications.
Generally, where a conflict exists between the Supreme Court of
United States and New York State Courts as to the correct
interpretation of United States Constitution, state courts are bound
by the Supreme Court's interpretation. 3 1 However, the state court
can afford its citizens additional protection in its interpretation of
its State Constitution, but cannot take away any rights that the
Federal Constitution grants. 32 New York Courts have therefore
interpreted the New York Constitution more stringently than its
federal counterpart, reasoning that the federal interpretation would
undermine the rights of its
citizens to be "free from unreasonable
33
intrusion."
governmental
28
29

Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This section provides, in relevant part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons to be seized.

Id.

30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
31 Reynolds, 185 Misc. 2d at 677, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
32 Id.
33 Id. (articulating a list of cases in which the Court of Appeals carved out an

independent body of search and seizure law under the New York Constitution).
See, e.g., People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1992) (holding that an owner is constitutionally protected under Article I §12
from unreasonable search of land outside the curtilage); People v. Dunn, 77
N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1219
(1990) (holding that a canine sniff search is an invasion go a defendant's
expectation of privacy under Article I § 12); People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431,
494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986) (holding that the nonconsensual
search of defendant's car to determine the vehicle identification number violated
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Prior to Whren, it was well settled law in New York that a
police officer could not use traffic violations as a mere pretext to
stop a defendant to investigate an unrelated matter. 34 The various
departments consistently looked beyond the initial traffic
primary or subjective
violations to determine what the officer's
35
stop.
the
making
for
was
motivation
In the four years since the Whren decision, the New York
Appellate Courts have had difficulty determining whether Whren
supersedes New York's long-held principle that pretextual stops
are outlawed.36 The Court of Appeals' failure to enunciate a
decision as to whether pretextual stops are grounded in the
protection against unreasonable search and seizure provided for in
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of New York have caused the
departments to adopt their own approaches to the issue addressed
in Whren. The First Department has adopted the objective test
adhered to in Whren. In People v. Robinson, the First Department
explicitly adopted the federal view that "the subjective reason of
the police for stopping an automobile is irrelevant in ascertaining
the probable cause as long as the stop was reasonable.37 Consistent
with the First Department, the Second Department has also
adopted the objective test articulated in Whren, but has shied away
the defendant's Article I § 12 right against unreasonable search and seizure);
People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985)
(declining pursuant to Article I § 12, to apply the warrantless search analysis of
"totality of the circumstances" articulated by the Supreme Court); People v.
Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (declining to apply
a good faith exception to the warrant requirement); People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d
49, 432 N.E.2d 745, 4,47 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1982) (holding that a contemporaneous
search after a lawful stop is permitted where police has reason to believe car
may contain evidence related to the crime for which the occupant was arrested
or that a weapon may be discovered or a means of escape available).
34 Reynolds, 185 Misc. 2d at 681, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
35 See, e.g., People v. Ynoa, 223 A.D.2d 975, 636 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep't.
1996); People v. Laws, 213 A.D.2d 226, 623 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dep't. 1995);
People v. Lewis, 195 A.D.2d 523, 600 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't. 1992); People v.
Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223 (4th Dep't. 1991); People v.
Watson, 157 A.D.2d 476, 549 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep't. 1990); People v. Llopis,
125 A.D.2d 416, 509 N.Y.S.2d 135, People v. Flanagan, 56 A.D.2d 658, 391
N.Y.S.2d 907 (2d Dep't. 1977).
36 Reynolds, 185 Misc. 2d at 682, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
37 People v. Robinson,. 271 A.D.2d 17, 24, 711 N.Y.S.2d 384, 390 (1st Dep't.

2000).
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from analyzing the primary motivation for the pretext stops.
However, the Third and Fourth Departments have continued to use
the primary motivation test in its determination of pretextual
also treated the pretext issue differently
stops. 38 Lower courts have
39
than the higher courts.
The New York Court of Appeals has not addressed this
issue since the Whren decision, and has thus given no guidance to
the lower courts of New York. The Court of Appeals has the
authority to interpret state constitutional provisions and to impart
on its citizens additional rights and protections than those offered
under the Federal Constitution. The lower courts have followed
the principle, guided by precedent, that "police stops of
automobiles ... are legal only pursuant to routine, nonpretextual
traffic checks to enforce traffic regulations or when there exists at
least reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the
vehicle have committed or are about to commit a crime. ' 4° The
Whren decision, interpreting the Fourth Amendment of the United
Sates Constitution, is inconsistent with the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of Aarticle I, § 12 of the New York State
Constitution. 4 1 Furthermore, although the Federal Constitution
permits such pretextual stops, it does not require New York courts
to permit the same if it would infringe on the rights of New York
citizens. After setting forth the New York. State decisions
regarding pretextual stops and discussing the Whren decision and
its implications, the County Court concluded that the precedent set
forth in the State of New York is clear regarding the prohibition
against pretextual stops and should be applied to the case at bar.
The case law interpreting the protections granted by the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
38

See, e.g., People v. Peterson, 245 A. D.2d 815, 666 N.Y.S.2d 785 (3d Dept.

1997); People v. Perruccio, 267 A.D.2d 1082, 700 N.Y.S.2d 347, cert. denied,
94 N.Y.2d 905 (4th Dept. 1999).
39 See, e.g., People v. Lucas, 183 Misc. 2d 639, 704 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1999)
(applying an objective analysis in reviewing reasonable cause for the vehicular
stop); People v. Dickson, 180 Misc. 2d 113, 690 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1998) (applying
the primary motivation test stating that it has "long served as an underpinning of
New
York's constitutional protections").
40
Reynolds, 185 Misc. 2d at 680, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 818 (citing People v. Spencer,
84 N.Y.2d 749, 753, 646 N.E.2d 785, 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (1995)).
41 See supra notes 33 and 35.
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§ 12 of the New York Constitution clearly shows that said rights
under the Federal Constitution and the New York State
Constitution are not identical.
The Fourth Amendment, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, does
not require an analysis of the individual officers' subjective
intentions when determining probable cause in investigative
automobile stops. 42 However, despite the Whren decision, New
York courts have interpreted Article I, § 12 of the New York
Constitution stringently, and have consistently held that pretextual
stops are not permitted.43 When determining whether probable
cause exists, New York courts look to the officer's subjective as
well as the objective reasons for the automobile checks.
Jill Weinberg

Whren, 517 U.S. at 819.
See, e.g., People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920
People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990);
People v. Ynoa, 223 A.D.2d 975, 636 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d. Dep't. 1996); People v.
Laws, 213 A.D.2d 226, 623 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dep't. 1995); People v. Lewis,
195 A.D.2d 523, 600 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't. 1992); People v. Camnarre, 171
A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223 (4th Dep't. 1991); People v. Watson, 157
A.D.2d 476, 549 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep't., 1990).
42

43
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